The Democratic Progressive Party and Independence

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An issue on the back burner?

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THE special conference organised by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on its policy towards China came to an end on February 15th this year. The discussions had been intended to unite the party's different factions around a common definition of its China policy. They helped party members to agree on the principle that the process of negotiation with China might begin without any preliminary acknowledgement from Peking of Taiwan's sovereign independence. This agreement may be regarded as surprising, to the extent that the DPP considers itself an independence party; and all the more so since 1991 when the principle of Taiwanese self-determination was written into its charter.

One must take account of the fact, however, that the DPP's thinking has evolved considerably since the party was founded in 1986. The claim to independence is no longer considered as the main source of legitimacy for its political campaign, just as it is no longer seen as its exclusive mobilising appeal to the electorate. Dissent within the DPP has led to the creation, in December 1996, of a new party, the Taiwan Independence Party (*Jianguodang*) or TAIP; the DPP's victory in the last local elections was won at a time when the question of Taiwan's independence had been excluded from discussion; both these developments have lent support to this evolution. In fact the DPP is going through a period of mutation; and the mid-February conference, which reconciled the two main factions, at least provisionally, was the official confirmation of this fact.

It would be a mistake to think that Taiwan's independence no longer matters to DPP members. Yet the meaning of this claim has changed, along with its place in the party's political programme. For this reason, it is useful to look back over the stages of the independence movement's evolution, from the time of the *dangwai* (literally, those "out of the party") to the present day, while emphasising the political stakes that the claim has covered and often concealed.

Democracy and national security: the founders of the *dangwai* struggle

The *dangwai* is the opposition movement that gave birth to the DPP. It was formed at the start of the 1970s by Taiwanese politicians independent of or excluded from the Kuomintang (KMT). Gradually it took shape as a political group, gathering strength as time went on to taking part in elections [1].

The opposition attacked the three main characteristics of the government that the KMT had established on the island. First of all, it protested against the monolithic character of the political system, and challenged its assumption of normality. Martial law and the "provisional measures adopted during a period of communist rebellion" had the effect of giving a legal basis to the monopoly enjoyed by the nationalist party. And the authorities could use them to justify implementing an emergency regime that, giving strict control over different social structures, made it easier for them to prevent or repress any rebellion. Secondly, the opposition questioned the ideological stance that the government had adopted and from which it derived its legitimacy. This ideology included spreading the sense of "sacred" mission with which the Kuomintang had invested itself: the reconquest of mainland China and the reunification of the country according to the "Three Principles of the People". The institutions of the Republic of China were drawn up in respect for this very objective. They limited the extent of political activity: we should remember that the first partial national elections were not held until 1969. Furthermore, the whole of the state's economic and political administration remained in control of the "mainlanders", while being denied to those of Taiwanese stock. Lastly, opposition members condemned the KMT's educational policy, which was aimed at integrating the island's people into the Chinese nation, and denied the existence of Taiwan's cultural and historical individuality.

The members of the *dangwai* took advantage of areas of freedom that the government tolerated by reason of the democratic guarantee it had given in exchange for American aid and protection. Starting from the middle of the 1970s, they embarked upon a process of structuring and rationalising their movement's activity. The local elections, and the partial national elections, were an opportunity for them to recruit independent politicians, to acquire a base of popular support and to spread their ideas: outside the election campaigns, these were expressed in magazines that were often censored by the government.

By basing themselves on the democratic principle, the *dangwai* demanded that martial law should be lifted, that genuine political pluralism should be created, and that mainlanders and Taiwanese should be accorded equality of rights and of opportunity. The local elections were the chance for them to denounce the ineffective and corrupt management carried on by local authorities loyal to the nationalist party. The partial national elections were held at a time when the Republic of China, having surrendered in 1971 its UN seat to the People's Republic, was finding itself more and more isolated within the international community. The poll offered *dangwai* members the chance to disseminate their ideas, of which the dominant strand was the survival and security of the country. The fear of annexation by the People's Republic intensified opposition members' desire for democratisation, that is to say, for Taiwanese people to be granted full participation in their national political life. They demanded that the government should give up the myths of reconquest and reunification. For them the country's survival was mainly based on recognising and advancing the full potential of Taiwanese society.

At the time that diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China were established in 1979, the demand for democracy was enriched by a "nationalist" dimension that was specifically Taiwanese. Fearing that the island might quite simply be handed over to the communists, the *dangwai* movement developed a policy declaring the rights of the Taiwanese people to decide freely their own future. Its members pressed not only for democracy to be introduced, but also for the principle of self-determination to be respected. They desired the international community—and above all Washington—to recognise that Taiwan was a political entity, independent from the Peking government, and with the right to defend its territory and its own institutions.

During that same period, the Presbyterian Church (*zhanglaohui*) had already adopted an explicitly pro-independence position. In a declaration that was made public in August 1977, it affirmed its desire to see Taiwan recognised as a new independent state. It thus went beyond the terms of an earlier declaration, that of December 1971, which claimed respect for the principle of self-determination for the Taiwanese people. The 1978 declaration represented the political position of the Presbyterians in the South of the island, who were led by the Reverend Kao Chun-ming. This church, linked to the Taiwanese people by a long tradition, regarded itself as the national religion: it sought to develop its religious activities in harmony with the cultural and social environment. Accordingly, it tended to promote the local languages: bibles were translated into Taiwanese, and into indigenous languages, Ayatal in particular [2]. Yet the position adopted by the Presbyterians in the South was not shared by those in the North, who were much more conservative, and less radically opposed to those in power.

Even though, by the end of the 1970s, *dangwai* members were opting to take a clearly pro-independence direction, they parted company with the Presbyterian Church to the extent that they were still attached to the institutional framework of the Republic of China, and felt at home with its historical and moral values [3]. Even so—and herein lies the ambiguity of their political thinking—by claiming the right of nations to self-determination, they were tending to sketch the outlines of a political entity that, by virtue of its past and its sense of identity, had a separate existence. According to the principles of international law elaborated in the United Nations, this separate existence

Marching towards independence?

Hsu Hsin-liang and Annette Lu (centre) after her victory in march 1997

would prohibit any integration within another political entity if the local people did not desire it.

In fact, such thinking had a dual resonance. By affirming the existence of a historical, cultural and social identity that was specific to Taiwan, opposition members were striving on the one hand to assert the Taiwanese people's right to participate fully in the nation's political life: they wanted the government to bring emergency rule to an end, and to guarantee the normal functioning of institutions, in respect for the spirit of the constitution. On the other hand, the *dangwai* justified in this way their unwillingness to accept reunification with the People's Republic of China without a preliminary vote of the island's people.

In December 1979, after the events of Kaohsiung, the leaders of the *dangwai* movement were arrested and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment. It was only through the impetus of a new generation that the movement was relaunched. The territorial character of its aims was considerably accentuated: numerous articles in the opposition press asserted the absence of historical or cultural links with China, implicitly claiming independence for the island. With time, two factions were formed. The Formosa faction (*Meilidao*) was moderate and loyal to the institutional framework of the Republic of China: it demanded the introduction of democracy. The New Wave faction (*Xin chaoliu*) was radical, and based itself on the principle of self-determination: it demanded a constitutional overhaul, and the future creation of a new state. This division of the movement into two political groups was to persist after the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party.

Taiwanese independence becomes the opposition's political aim

The co-existence of these two factions among the *dangwai* impelled the movement, from as early as 1986, to campaign both for the full implementation of the constitution—that is to say, for democratisation—and for self-determination. This principle was reaffirmed at the time that the Democratic Progressive Party was formed, in September 1986, and written into its charter. Indeed the paragraph dealing with foreign affairs laid down that Taiwan's future was to be freely decided upon by all its people. For the members of the New Wave, in particular Chiu I-jen and Chen Shui-bian, the present mayor of Taipei, this principle was a roundabout way of advocating independence. It seemed to them that genuine reforms could be undertaken only if the idea of Greater China, that is to say, the myth of reunifying the island and the mainland within the Chinese nation, was abandoned. Only the proclamation of independence seemed adequate to satisfy the need for recognition that had been evident among the Taiwanese community for some years. It was also, with the collapse of the nationalist regime, the necessary condition for introducing democracy.

On the other hand, for the members of the Formosa faction, such as Hsieh Chang-ting and Yu Ching, the DPP's principal objective was to remain the introduction of democracy. The declaration of independence was not seen as enough to bring emergency rule to an end. Democracy would come only through the efforts of the opposition who, acting as a pressure group, would lead the government in the path of liberalisation. The island's independence was considered a long-term political objective. As for the principle of self-determination, its significance was mainly internal: it meant that the whole of the Taiwanese population was to be responsible for the political, social and economic evolution of the land they inhabited [4].

Nevertheless, the growing importance of the radicals led the party to adopt, on April 17th 1988, a resolution providing for independence to be declared in four specific eventualities.

> 1. In order to secure the confidence of Taiwan's people and clear up the international status of Taiwan, this Party reaffirms that the international sovereignty of Taiwan is independent and does not belong to the "PRC" with its capital in Beijing (Peking). Any change in the international status of Taiwan must be with the consent of the majority of the people of Taiwan.
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> 2. If the KMT and the Communists hold unilateral peace talks; if the KMT betrays the interests of Taiwan's people; if the PRC annexes Taiwan; or if the KMT does not carry out true constitutional democracy, then this Party advocates that Taiwan should be independent. [5]

It was not until three years later, during the fifth DPP congress, that the demand for independence was explicitly written into the party's charter. It was on October 13th 1991, on the proposal of Chen Shui-bian, that inde-

pendence became officially one of the main political aims of the DPP:

> "Taiwan is sovereign and independent; it does not belong to the PRC just as Taiwan's sovereignty does not extend to mainland China. This assertion reflects both an historic reality and the present situation. It is also accepted by the whole international society." [...] Consequently, we advocate the following:
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> 1. In accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty, the creation of an independent state and the adoption of a new constitution so that the legal and institutional systems can match Taiwan's social reality, and so that Taiwan can rejoin the international society in conformity with the principles of international law;
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> 2. In accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty, the redefining of the limits of national and territorial sovereignty, as well as of people's sovereignty, the drawing-up of a legal structure for cross-Straits exchanges based on international law, a structure that can safeguard the respective interests of peoples residing on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." [16]

Independence: seal of authentication for the opposition programme

It would be proper to inquire into the meaning of the independence claim asserted at that time by the DPP. As we have stressed before, for the dangwai members, Taiwanese nationalist thinking answered a need for recognition of the political rights of the majority of the island's inhabitants; it also reflected the willingness to assert before the international community, and the United States in particular, the people's desire to preserve the independence and sovereignty of Formosa.

By autumn 1991, the government was already resolutely committed to the introduction of democracy. Furthermore, the monopoly enjoyed by the mainlanders in the political structure had largely been broken. Indeed on October 15th 1986, the Kuomintang's Central Committee had announced its decision to lift martial law and to permit the formation of opposition parties. This proposal was adopted by the Legislative Yuan in June 1987. Then, in March 1990, the National Assembly elected Lee Teng-hui, who is of Taiwanese stock, as President of the Republic (since the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, in January 1988, Lee had been president only in a caretaker capacity). It was Lee Teng-hui who gave impetus to the process of democratisation. His first step was the abolition in April 1991 of the "provisional measures adopted during a period of communist rebellion". This démarche opened the way, on the one hand, to constitutional reform leading to the first general elections (to the National Assembly in December 1991 and to the Legislative Yuan a year later). On the other hand, it strengthened the détente policy towards the People's Republic, which helped reduce the tension between the two Chinas. Three years later, in 1994, a further constitutional revision provided for the election of the president of the Republic by direct universal suffrage. This new type of poll was to confer upon the head of state a strictly "Taiwanese" legitimacy, permanently breaking the institutional link that the government had hitherto desired to maintain, although spuriously, with the mainland [17]. These reforms brought in their train both the opprobrium of conservatives inside the Kuomintang, and the radicalisation of the DPP's message.

The political context within which the independence clause was adopted was no longer that obtaining in the time of martial law; it was that of a country in full process of democratisation. Moreover, the risk that the People's Republic might resort to aggression had been reduced by reason of the policy of dialogue with Peking, a policy that the KMT had launched at the same time.

To understand the claim to independence, it seems necessary to place it within the framework of the DPP's political struggle against the KMT. In September 1986, the *dangwai* members had gathered themselves into an opposition party that was first tolerated, then legalised by the government. The party was to play a full part in the political contest, of which the eventual goal was undeniably the conquest of power. This goal could only be achieved through victories in various elections. So it was essential for the DPP to win the support of the electorate: it had to voice a political orientation with which the voter could identify, helped in particular by a strongly emotional sense of community. To underline its difference from the KMT, the DPP favoured an image that was resolutely Taiwanese in aspiration.

So the DPP candidates systematically conducted their election rallies in the Taiwanese language. The party's propaganda regularly evoked episodes from the island's history in which the Taiwanese people had had to suffer the brutalities of the Nationalist regime: the events of February 28th 1947, and above all the period of the White Terror. The rift between the mainland and Taiwanese communities was widened by a rhetoric that likened the KMT to a colonial power. The DPP thus presented itself as the sole legatee of the struggle for democracy and for the emancipation of the Taiwanese people; they claimed that this struggle that had been led, within the country, by the *dangwai* members, whose leaders had been imprisoned in 1979; and, abroad, by independence campaigners most of whom were not yet permitted to come home to the island. Finally, the party undertook to campaign for the restoration of Taiwan to the United Nations.

For this reason, the claim to independence served above all the function of providing the DPP with a supplementary source of legitimacy: it gave a strong direction to the political commitment of its members. Further, it defined the nature of the opposition programme, and of its relations with the government. To advocate independence was to go beyond the reforms that the government had undertaken since 1986; it was to fix an objec-

tive that the government would never be able to reach. Having established a clear demarcation between itself and the majority party, it thus became easier for the DPP to cultivate the electorate's loyalty. What is more, now that the independence claim was enshrined in the party's charter, it enabled the radicals of the New Wave to give a particular hue to their party's activism. Compromise was banished.

While appealing for a new constitution to be written, the DPP opposed the early stages of the constitutional reform of 1991. Similarly, it fiercely criticised the negotiation process begun in 1992 between Taipei and Peking (the talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait).

Yet both internal and external pressures were to lead the DPP to moderate its line, and give a new direction to its independence campaign. Indeed its claim turned out to be unrealisable in practice. Not only would a declaration of Taiwan's independence have brought about an armed intervention by China; but, furthermore, few states would have agreed to recognise the fledgling "Republic of Taiwan". Certainly, the isolation that afflicted China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square events, together with conspicuous progress towards political democracy in Taiwan, have aroused the hope in the minds of DPP members that the island would win recognition by the international community. From that time onwards, nonetheless, the DPP had to take account both of the mediocre results they gained in national and local elections during 1990 and 1991, and of the new international context. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union; the removal of the Soviet threat; the growing power of China; and the concern of the United States, from 1992 onwards, to resume high level relations with China; all these developments could only increase the pressure on the Taiwanese campaigners for independence.

Acknowledging the island's *de facto* independence

The evolution of the party's ideology, from rebellious separatism to acknowledgement of de facto independence, was accomplished in several stages, between 1993 and the month of February 1998. This evolution reveals a fundamental change in the way in which party members perceive the island's political situation, as well as its relationship with the People's Republic. The party no longer clamours for the establishment of an independent and sovereign Republic of Taiwan, nor does it disown the historical and cultural relations that connect the island to China. Those at the heart of the DPP have progressively come to a new awareness, one that is now becoming, not without numerous convulsions, the prevailing tendency.

In fact, the political reforms enacted since the DPP was formed have helped to carve out on this island territory the rough outlines of a political entity that is independent and sovereign: its only remaining deficiency is the international community's refusal to recognise it as such. But it is true that the United States' interest in maintaining peace and security in the Taiwan Strait does implicitly guarantee its existence. It is this reality, so proclaimed since the start of the 1990s by the KMT itself, that the DPP has been progressively induced to acknowledge, by thus giving up its hopes of a new state. This change of direction shows, not just that the DPP will be satisfied in the near future with the status quo, but above all that its ambitions remain confined within the domestic political scene. By this adjustment, indeed, the DPP is responding to various factors in the political interaction within Taiwan. On the one hand, the over-ambitious claims of the nationalists are no longer desirable while the people, dreading an attack from the People's Republic, show themselves unshakeably favourable to this solution. On the other, Lee Teng-hui's introduction of democracy and his pragmatic foreign policy have considerably weakened the impact of pro-independence rhetoric. Indeed the president himself has expressed several times over his attachment to Taiwan, his birthplace. And he has helped to marginalise within the KMT the pro-reunification faction that, since 1993, has been grouped around the New Party.

It has been the experience of successive elections that have transformed the DPP. The change has been fundamental: the party's political thinking now embraces other themes than that of independence. Similarly, the DPP no longer excludes the prospect of co-operating with the government. This evolution may be illustrated by four key moments in the party's history.

The first stage was the electoral campaign fought by Chen Shui-bian for the leadership of the Taipei city administration in December 1994. He won with 44% of the vote, on a programme in which the independence claim had not been mentioned. He had composed his manifesto around the leitmotif "Happiness and Hope", promising people that he would answer the expectations that the former KMT mayor had shown himself unable to fulfil: a cure for insecurity and pollution, and a guarantee for each person of a better quality of life [8]. At the time of the late 1992 legislative elections, Chen Shui-bian had shown himself to be one of the most passionate and committed partisans of the pro-independence campaign; in 1994, however, he assumed a far more moderate profile, since it had turned out that victory was only possible with support from the centrist vote [9]. Chen Shui-bian's success was followed by what the media dubbed his "honeymoon" with Lee Teng-hui. By co-operating in this way, both men were better able to realise their respective political aims [10].

The second stage took effect in 1995 with the first public challenge to pro-independence orthodoxy. Shih Ming-teh, who was then president of the DPP, opened up a policy of reconciliation with the New Party. This

démarche was justified by the two parties' common objective, which was to pursue the introduction of social reforms over which the KMT was dragging its feet [11]. In September 1995, Shih Ming-teh was questioned in Washington about the significance of the pro-independence demand—this was shortly before he stated his interest in forming an alliance with the pro-reunification party within the Legislative Yuan: his answer was that the DPP would not have to declare Taiwan's independence, because its independence had already been effective for many years. The acceptance of the island's de facto independence became the party's guiding principle.

Shih Ming-teh

The spring 1996 missile crisis, as well as the election of Lee Teng-hui as president of the Republic, strengthened this orientation, which gave rise—stage three—to a policy of open rapprochement with the majority party. Indeed Hsu Hsin-liang, now president of the DPP, considered it advantageous to form an alliance with the KMT at a time when it was relatively weak and needed DPP support to push through its constitutional reforms. Anticipating the victory that this moderate policy would win for the DPP in the local elections of 1997, and still more in the general elections of December 1998, Hsu Hsin-liang saw the alliance as the first step towards winning cabinet posts for the DPP in a future coalition government. This policy was attacked, on the one hand, by the hard-line independence campaigners who, as we have seen, broke away in December 1996 to form the Independence Party, on the other hand, Shih Ming-teh and Lin Yi-hsiung, former and future presidents of the party, also came out against the policy [12].

The debate in mid February 1998 was to be the fourth, and perhaps last, stage in the DPP's long process of mutation. In this encounter, the arguments were presented by the representatives of the four Democratic Progressive Party factions: the Formosa faction, the New Wave faction, the Front for Justice and the Front for Welfare. Two individuals had a particular influence on the debates: Hsu Hsin-liang, who was then president of the party and a member of the Formosa faction, and Chiu I-jen, secretary general of the party and a representative of the New Wave [13].

Two opposing points of view were advanced, Hsu and his supporters taking one side, the rest of the DPP leadership taking the other. Both sides put forward different policies with regard to the Chinese People's Republic. In fact, the focus was on two main questions, debated on February 14th and 15th. On one hand, the framework had to be set for future negotiations and exchanges between Taiwan and the People's Republic; on the other, a policy had to be selected that would help to integrate the development of economic relations between the two countries on their forthcoming entry to the World Trade Organisation. The speeches brought about a consensus symbolised by the formula adopted at the end of the conference to sum up its aims: "to strengthen Taiwan while forging closer links westwards". At the same time, the members of the Formosa faction close to Hsu, and the other DPP leaders, by reason of their differing perception of the international context and especially of the evolution of Sino-American relations, advocated policies towards China that were enterprising, for some, and prudent, for others [14].

Indeed, according to Hsu Hsin-liang, since Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States, the positive turn taken by relations between Washington and Peking threatens to intensify Taiwan's isolation on the international political scene. So it is desirable to accelerate the process of negotiations with the People's Republic, and to encourage the formation of direct commercial links—postal, air and maritime links (*santong*)—across the Taiwan Strait. What is more, the democratisation of the People's Republic is perceived as dependent upon economic development, to which Taiwanese entrepreneurs, by means of their investments, can make a significant contribution. For this reason, Hsu advocates "a bold policy of advance westwards" (*dadanxijin*).

Chiu I-jen and most of the other DPP leaders, for their part, are more optimistic about the international climate. Maintaining the status quo, that is to say, preserving stability and peace across the Taiwan Strait, is essential to the political and economic interests of Japan and the United States in the region; so they consider that Washington is ready to intervene in the event that the island's security were threatened. In consequence, moving closer to the People's Republic is not an urgent question. The priority is rather to strengthen Taiwan's economic and political position (*qiangben*) before any attempt to bring about the "three direct links". Moreover, the heavy volume of Taiwanese investment in the People's Republic leaves the island vulnerable to the slightest economic imbalance that might come about [15]. So these DPP leaders favour the policy of prudence recommended for

some years by the government, and summed up in Lee Teng-hui's phrase "let us advance slowly and let us be prudent" (*jieji yongren*); the policy is to allow only small and medium-sized businesses to open up in China, banning all investments above US$50 million.

This debate was welcomed by many politicians—and by those of the governing majority as much as those of the opposition [16]. In effect, the DPP members have come to a compromise solution whereby, in the first place, negotiations with the People's Republic will be handled by the Taipei and Peking city governments, and not by the governing parties, the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party ; secondly, the discussions will not necessarily deal with the question of the three direct links, or that of the island's political sovereignty; thirdly, the fact of the negotiations coming to a conclusion or not must be considered only as being of relative importance [17].

So the claim to independence has become a marginal position. The leadership of the DPP is now concentrating on maintaining the party's internal cohesion and preparing for the legislative elections this coming December. Accordingly, the debate about policy towards China was mainly intended to confirm, for the voters' benefit, the image of a party that is responsible and ready to govern the country. Beyond any doubt, unity has been achieved, even though Chen Shui-bian seemed to want to distance himself from the new understanding. Indeed, a series of comments that he made both in America and Taiwan showed him to be, on the one hand, very attached to the party's pro-independence charter and, on the other, opposed to the compromise solution on which the debate ended [18]. The political ambitions that Chen Shui-bian is now pursuing explain the reason for his reservations. Chen is seeking re-election as mayor of Taipei at the end of this year, and is a prospective DPP candidate in next year's presidential elections: is he not obliged to carve out for himself the image of a strong man, positioned above the fray and by that very fact endowed with the stature of a leader? On top of which, as leader of the Front for Justice, some of whose members (Chen Yung-hsing amongst others) have left the DPP to join the Independence Party, Chen cannot afford openly to ally himself with the moderate strand of the DPP: it could have a troublesome effect upon his political influence, just a few months short of the December municipal elections.

The DPP's ideological evolution is a sign that the party is being called upon to play an increasingly important role in Taiwan's political life. The extreme nature of the demands that the DPP put forward in its early days was above all the expression of its desire to play a full part in the island's political management. DPP members, outnumbered within the representative national institutions, and absent from the mechanisms of power, have been for a long time excluded from such participation, as we have already stressed.

Today, the dream of a democratic society, prosperous and secure within its borders, has largely been fulfilled. What is at stake, in the years to come, will be to put in place the basis of a direct dialogue between the DPP and the Chinese Communist Party. Contacts of this kind have already been made, and the DPP's willingness to moderate its pro-independence language should help towards rapid progress. The task of securing this new bridge falls to Lin Yi-hsiung, the party's new president. And, still more difficult, he must contrive to bring the party's differing factions together in defence of these new objectives, without blurring the party's original features as compared with the KMT. ■

1. See Samia Ferhat-Dana, *Le mouvement dangwai ou « hors-parti » à Taiwan (1949-1986) . étude de la valorisation de l'entité politique taiwanaise au sein de la République de Chine*, Paris, PhD Thesis, Université Paris XI, November 1996, to be published (L'Harmattan) in 1998.
2. Claude Geoffroy, *Le mouvement indépendantiste taiwanais, ses origines et son développement depuis 1945*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1997, pp. 188-199.
3. The *dangwai* distinguished themselves from the stance taken by Peng Ming-min, a Taiwan National University professor who took refuge in Sweden at the beginning of the 1970s after trying to publish a manifesto in Taiwan in 1964. In this manifesto, Peng Ming-min had developed a theory later named "One China, one Taiwan", which implied the negation of all institutional link between China and Taiwan and, consequently, the necessity to establish a new constitution and a new governement on the island.
4. Huang Teh-fu, *Minzhu jinbu dang yu Taiwan de minzhuhua* (The Democratic Progressive Party and Democratisation in Taiwan), Taipei, Shiying, 1992, pp. 118-121
5. *Party for Democratic Progress*, Taipei 1998, p. 55.
6. *Minzhu jinbu dang dangzhang danggang* (DPP Constitution and Programme), Taipei, DPP Central Office, August 1995, pp. 14-15.
7. The fact that the president of the Republic had, until then, been elected by the National Assembly maintained the illusion of a representativeness and a legitimacy that spread all over the ROC territory, that is to say Taiwan province *and* the mainland.
8. *Zhongguo Shibao* (China Times), December 5th 1994, p. 5.
9. Zhuang Shenghong, "Chen Shuibian kaozhe zhongjian zhanlue kuaile de gongxia Taipeishi" (Adopting a centrist strategy, Chen Shui-bian Happily Launches an Aassault on Taipei City), *Xinxinwen* (The Journalist), December 4th-10th 1994, pp. 38-39.
10. Lin Ze'an, "Li Denghui, Chen Shuibian he Xu Xinliang de sanjiao guanxi " (The triangular relations between Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Hsu Hsin-liang), *Jiushi niandai* (The Nineties), May 1997, pp. 75-77. The journalist does not specify the terms of this co-operation. However, it is likely that the war that Chen Shui-bian declared to the mafia, which put an end to all sorts of illegal dealings, could not not have been carried through without the support of the president. In return, Chen Shui-bian has perhaps made it possible for the KMT to gain the support of the opposition on particluar projects.
11. Interview with Shih Ming-teh, July 3rd 1997
12. Shih Ming-teh was absent at the Conference on National Development in December 1996. As for Lin Yi-hsiung, he called for the resignation of Hsu Hsin-liang in May 1997.
13. After completing his term, Hsu Hsin-liang was replaced by Lin Yi-hsiung as president of the DPP on June 7th 1998.
14. *Lianhebao* (United Daily News), February 15th 1998, p. 4; *Minzhu jinbu dang zhongguo zhengce yantaohui gongshi* (Joint Communiqué on the Conference on the DPP's China Policy), Department of Chinese affairs, March 11th 1998, 3 pp.
15. *Zhongguo Shibao*, January 11th 1998, p. 4.
16. *The China Post*, February 17th 1998, p. 2.
17. *Lianhebao*, op. cit.
18. *Zhongguo Shibao*, March 18th 1998, p. 2.